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SALE OF CONTROLLING
INTEREST: A FINANCIAL

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE GOVERNING LAW

IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA*
JoshuaRonen**
Generally, purchasersof a controllingstock interest in the United States do not
have an obligation to offer (nor must sellers secure) the samepremium price to minority shareholdersofthe corporation. In some situationsin Canada such an obligation
exists. This Article examines the economic efficiency of these two approaches. Professor Ronen concludes that, notwithstandingsome notable deviations in American case
lawfrom what is normatively desirable,the American approachcomes close to being
economically efficient

INTRODUCTION

THE MAJOR ISSUE addressed in this Article is whether a shareholder, holding a controlling interest' in a corporation, can sell

* An earlier version of this Article was submitted in connection with the CanadaUnited States Comparative Corporation Law Conference, conducted on October 16-19, 1984,
by the Canada-United States Law Institute of Case Western Reserve University and the
University of Western Ontario. The conference was jointly sponsored by Osgoode Hall Law
School (of York University) and the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Support for the
conference was furnished by the Business Fund for Canadian Studies in the United States,
The Mary Coding McCrea Foundation, and The George Gund Foundation.
** Professor of the School of Business, New York University. B.A. 1963, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel; Graduate Degree in Accounting 1959, Hebrew University; Ph.D.
1969, Stanford University; Director, Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research; Editor-in-Chief, J. OF Accr., AUDITING AND FIN. The author is grateful for comments received
from Dan Thorton and Philip Anisman.
1. A "controlling interest" is the amount of corporate stock held by the dominant
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his ownership to a third party at a premium without the obligation
to have the same premium offered to minority shareholders.
"Sale of control" transactions can arise in different situations.
These situations are described in detail in an article by Robert
Hamilton.2
In essence, the transaction involves a shareowner with de facto
control3 of the corporation who agrees to sell his shares to an outsider for an above-market price. Generally, the opportunity to sell
is not extended to public shareholders. The sale agreement typically provides that the directors designated by the seller are to resign and be replaced by designees of the purchasers. Variations on
this framework abound within a wide spectrum of sale of control
contricts.4 However, these variations do not alter the basic features
of a control transaction sufficiently to require a change in my mode
of analysis. Hence, the analysis will focus on whether, from the
standpoint of economic efficiency, the opportunity to sell at a premium made available to a controlling shareholder should be extended to all other shareholders.
It is assumed that a controlling shareholder, by virtue of his voting control, has the ability to install his own designees as directors
and officers and thus has control over the operational and informational decisions of the corporation. In other words, the presumption is that he can avail himself of nonpecuniary benefits.5
Section I briefly summarizes the governing law in the United
States and Canada.6 Section II provides the economic perspective
underlying the analysis of the transaction as well as the conclusions
shareholder. The Securities and Exchange Commission defines control as "the possession,
direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1986). However, determination of whom the controlling
person is does not depend upon the ownership of any specific percentage of shares and may be
highly factual. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 147 (1985).
2. See Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 248 (1985).
3. De facto control refers to the existence of control in actual fact although not by
official recognition.
4. For a description of the rich menu in use in Canada, see generally, Bailey & Crawford, Constraintsand ObligationsRelating to the Sale of Control: The CanadianApproach (in
press, 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. (1987)). For such a description of the American menu, see generally, Hamilton, supra note 2.
5. Such nonpecuniary benefits include the prestige of office, personal relations with
employees, direction of charitable contributions and use of facilities. Jensen & Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 312 (1976).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 11-27.
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of the analysis. The primary conclusion is that American case law
comes close to being economically efficient.7 Section III examines
some notable deviations in American case law from what is normatively desirable.8 Theories that are used to justify present legal doctrines in the United States and Canada are briefly addressed in
Section IV. Section V concludes my commentary.1°
I. THE LAW GOVERNING "SALE OF CONTROL" TRANSACTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Although details of the relevant legal norms are provided by
Hamilton" as well as Bailey and Crawford, 2 a brief sketch based
on their surveys may be useful. In the United States, the general
rule is that potential purchasers of a controlling ownership interest
in a corporation may offer whatever price they please for the shares
and that the controlling shareholders may sell their interest for
whatever price they can obtain. No such transaction can be attacked on the ground of inherent illegality, discrimination, or impropriety of multiple price structure. 3 However, liability may be
imposed on a seller who turns the control of a corporation over to
purchasers who loot the corporation's assets, causing losses to the
remaining shareholders and creditors. This liability can be imposed
more readily if the corporation's assets are readily salable and can
be avoided if the seller makes a reasonable investigation of the
purchaser. 14
In Canada, common law generally has not imposed any fiduciary duty on majority shareholders or directors of corporations, to
minority shareholders, when they "sell control" of the corporation
7. See infra text accompanying notes 28-79. An efficient distribution of fixed total
quantities of goods is one in which it is not possible through any change in the distribution to
benefit one person without making some other person worse off. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
461-62 (10th ed. 1976).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 80-93.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
11. See generally Hamilton, supra note 2.
12. See generally Bailey & Crawford, supra note 4.
13. See Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 376 (2d Cir. 1980);
Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
14. Kaster v. Modification Systems, Inc., 731 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1984); Estate of
Hooper v. Government of Virgin Islands, 427 F.2d 45, 47 (3d Cir. 1970); McDaniel v.
Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969). See O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling Corporate
Interest: Bases ofPossible Seller Liability, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 9, 16-23 (1976); Note, Jones v.
Ahmanson: The Fiduciary Obligation of Majority Shareholders, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1079,
1086 (1970).
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at a premium not generally available to other shareholders.15 But
the Securities Act of 1978 (Ontario)16 requires a purchaser of a
large block of shares in a public company to make an offer to
purchase the shares of the corporation's remaining shareholders at
equivalent value consideration. 17 The Act triggers that follow-up
obligation upon the acquisition of such number of the outstanding
voting securities of the target corporation as, when combined with
voting securities then owned by the offeror 8 and its associates19 and
by persons acting in concert with the offeror, will equal twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting securities in the target corporation.20 A further condition of the obligation is that the price
paid be greater than fifteen percent of the average closing prices
available on the ten business days preceding the purchase plus the
transaction costs. 21 The Securities Act (Quebec), enacted in 1982,
contains general takeover bid provisions similar to those in the Ontario legislation. 22 Amendments to the 1978 Securities Act, reflecting a consensus reached among the securities administrators of
Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec based on the Quebec Securities Act, have been proposed and are now under consideration. The primary effect of the proposals will be the adoption of
uniform legislation among the provinces. The modifications suggested in these proposals, however, do not alter the basic feature of
the Canadian rule for dealing with the control premium: an acquirer of controlling interest must make a similar offer to all public
15. See F.

IACOBUCCI, M. PILKINGTON & S. PRICHARD, CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPO-

RATIONS 457-58 (1977).

16. Securities Act of 1978, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466 (1980).
17. Id. § 91(1).
18. "Offeror" means a person or company other than an agent, who makes a takeover bid or an issuer bid and where two or more persons or companies make offers,
(i) jointly or in concert, or
(ii) jointly or in concert, or in concert any voting rights attaching to the securities acquired through the offers, then each of them shall shall be deemed to be an
offeror if the offer made by any of them is a take-over bid.
Id. § 88(1)(h).
19. In general, an "associate" is: (1) any company or person of which such person owns
voting securities with more than ten percent of the voting rights of the company, (2) "any
partner of that person or company," (3) any trust or estate in which such person or company
has a substantial beneficial interest or to which serves as trustee, or (4) any relative of such
person who has the same name. Id. § 1(1) V2.
20. Id. §§ 88(1)(k), 91.
21. ONT. REV. REGS. § 163(3) (1980).
22. Securities Act of Dec. 1982, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. 1, § 130-31 (1982). See generally
R. FORBES & D. JOHNSTON, CANADIAN COMPANIES AND THE STOCK EXCHANGES § 4000
(1980).
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shareholders.2"
Ohio and Pennsylvania have enacted statutes directed at tender
offers which also may affect control transactions.2 4 These statutes
make it more difficult to sell controlling interests at a premium
without some form of compensation to other shareholders.2 5 Despite these exceptions, the general rule which allows freedom of
transaction without an obligation to offer the same terms to remaining shareholders
appears to be almost universally accepted in the
26
States.
United
Thus, we encounter a contrast between the case law prevalent in
the United States and the statutory law applicable in Canada: potential sellers and purchasers of controlling interests in Canada are
required to offer an equal opportunity to the remaining shareholders of the target corporation. In the United States, with the exception of cases of consequent looting, 27 sellers and purchasers are free
from such encumbrances. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
explain this major difference. Undoubtedly, alignments of interest
groups and the distribution of power among them were factors responsible for setting in motion a political process that culminated in
the Canadian legislation. Instead, primary focus is directed to anal23.

See generally SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMITTEE ON TAKE-OVER BIDS, THtE REG-

ULATION OF TAKE-OVER BIDS IN CANADA: PREMIUM PRIVATE AGREEMENT TRANSACTIONS

(1983);

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CANADIAN SECURITIES LAWS, CANADIAN SECURITIES

LEGISLATION AND THE SALE OF CONTROL (Report to the

State Regulation of Securities

Committee on the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association) (1982).
24. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1910(G) (Purdon Supp. 1986). The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act was held unconstitutional in Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Aeronca, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). My analysis is
unaffected by this holding.
25. The Ohio statute, under certain circumstances, allowed shareholders (other than the
prospective buyer) to vote on whether to allow the sale of control transaction to proceed. A
majority of shares not owned by the buyer would defeat the transaction. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.831(E) (Baldwin 1985). According to Hamilton, the statute "may serve to compel the sharing of premiums in control share transactions." See Hamilton, supra note 2, at
283.
The Pennsylvania provision requires, in some instances, a controlling shareholder whose
voting shares exceed 30% to offer to purchase the shares of other shareholders at a fair price.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(G) (Purdon Supp. 1986). For a discussion of this statute, see
Hamilton, supra note 2, at 283-84.
26. A report by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers recommends prohibiting, except under certain circumstances, private sales
of control at a premium when the transaction involves more than 20% of the public corporation's voting shares. Reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,511 (Mar. 28, 1984). According to Professor Hamilton, the recommendation is not likely to be adopted since the SEC
has expressed reservations about its desirability. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 282 n.107.
27. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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ysis of the relative economic efficiency of the two rules. A foundation for a normative perspective is set out below.

II.

FINANCIAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE "SALE OF
CONTROL" TRANSACTION

The following analysis of the sale of control transaction assumes
a scenario whereby a shareholder with a controlling interest is free
to sell his ownership to a purchaser for whatever price he can get,
without any legal liability. This scenario is analyzed with respect to
both economic efficiency (in the sense of resource allocation) and
distribution of wealth among different groups of shareholders. I
then consider the potential impact on economic efficiency and
wealth distribution of legislation, such as now exists in Canada,
which imposes on the purchaser and the seller of the controlling
interest an obligation to offer to all other shareholders the same opportunity to sell their shares at the agreed upon price. Finally, I
consider the desirability of imposing liability on the seller for losses
to remaining shareholders suffered as a result of the looting of corporate assets by the purchaser.
The discussion of both scenarios will proceed in two stages. In
the first stage, I examine the genesis of the corporate form of organization when an entrepreneur decides to incorporate and raise capital by issuance of equity securities. In the second stage, I assume
that the corporation has matured and examine what happens when
a dominant shareholder identifies a purchaser who would potentially offer him a premium above market price in consideration for
his ownership interest.
While the analysis focuses on the second stage, it is important to
consider the first stage because both the original entrepreneur and
the initial financiers of the corporation's activities are expected to
anticipate such a second stage, whereby the dominant shareholder
(either the original entrepreneur or his ultimate replacement) sells
his interest to an outsider. Because of the existence of such rational
expectations, it is important to consider the impact of anticipated
sale of control transactions on the pricing of securities issued by the
entrepreneur at the first stage as well as on the incentives of the
entrepreneur to embark on his venture, which is assumed to have
positive net present value. Thus, after consideration of the first and
second stages, attention returns to the first stage to examine the anticipatory incentive effects of the second stage on the first, the formation and financing of the corporation.
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The analysis of the first stage below- conducted within a scenario where there is no liability for consequent losses that encumbers
the potential sale of control transaction-will draw on Jensen and
Meckling's analysis of agency costs. 28 However, a different mode of
analysis of the scenario is presented whereby one of their major (unrealistic) assumptions is relaxed. This analysis points to different
conclusions with respect to a manager's incentives to engage in
monitoring and bonding activities. The difference between my conclusion and theirs is crucial for the analysis of the potential impacts
of sale of control transactions.
A.

The OriginalFormation and Financingof the Corporation:An
Agency Framework2 9

Unlike Jensen and Meckling, 30 I argue that agency costs will not
always be borne by the manager and, therefore, while the manager
still has incentives to reduce his share of the agency costs, he will
not be motivated to reduce the share borne by the owners. As a
result, the monitoring and bonding contracts the manager enters
will not necessarily give rise to such information flow as would be
expected when agency costs are borne totally by the manager.
One of the requirements in Jensen and Meckling's analysis of
agency costs borne by the manager is that the market anticipates
the agency cost effects.3 1 In other words, prospective minority
shareholders and bondholders should be aware that the owner-manager's interests will diverge from theirs. The price they are willing
to pay for the shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect
of the divergence between the manager's interests and theirs. Specifically, if we consider as an example the case of outside equity, the
equity holders are assumed to be aware that the owner will increase
his nonpecuniary consumption when his ownership share is reduced. But equity holders are not only required to be cognizant of
the consequent nonpecuniary consumption-they must also know
the owner-manager's response to the change in his ownership. 2
Jensen and Meckling do not explain what mechanism will produce
such unbiased estimates; what sources, if any, will supply informa28. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5.
29. This subsection is based primarily on material included in Ronen, The Dual Role of
Accounting: A FinancialEconomic Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
415 (1979).
30. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 319 ("the decline in the total value of the
firm ... is entirely imposed on the owner-manager")(italics in original).
31. Id. at 313.
32. Id. at 318.
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tion on the manager's tastes for nonpecuniary benefits; and if there
are such sources of information, whether competitive or monopolistic, what price this information commands.
Indeed, if the equity market holds rational (i.e., unbiased) estimates of the manager's response to reduction of ownership, and if
the estimation errors are independent across firms, Jensen and
Meckling are justified in concluding that the risk inherent in
whatever uncertainties introduced by imperfect knowledge of the
owner-manager's response function is diversifiable and that, as a result, equilibrium prices will equal the expected values.33 A critical
issue is, then, how are such unbiased estimates obtained?
Information on the owner-manager's taste for nonpecuniary
benefits, and thus on his response to a reduced share in the firm's
ownership, can only come from two sources: (1) the manager himself, or (2) observations of the manager's behavior over time and his
past responses to reductions in his ownership share. Such observations must be made possible through some kind of monitoring
scheme that requires the gathering of information. This can be
quite costly, especially if the owner-manager does not cooperate in
providing information.
Will the owner-manager, pursuing his own interest, have an incentive to provide correct information on his response function?
Arguably, the cost of obtaining information on the owner-manager's response function will reduce the value of the firm and thus
increase agency costs, thereby motivating him to provide correct
information. But what is encountered in this instance is a moral
hazard situation characterized by information asymmetry similar to
the one analyzed by Akerlof.3 4 This asymmetry will cause minority
equity owners to bear some of the agency cost.
To illustrate how the agency cost will be shared between the
3
owner-manager and equity holders, consider Figure 1. 1
As in Jensen and Meckling's analysis, the F axis reflects the current market value of the stream of the manager's expenditures on
nonpecuniary benefits; the V axis represents the value of the firm.
Line VF represents the constraint which an owner-manager faces in
deciding how much nonpecuniary income he will extract from the
firm. OV is the value of the firm when the amount of nonpecuniary
income consumed is zero. The slope of VF is - 1 to indicate that
33. Id.
34. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons'" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490-92 (1970). See also infra note 64 and accompanying text.
35. See Ronen, supra note 29, at 421 (original version of this graph).
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FIGURE 1. The value of the firm M0 and the level of nonpecuniary benefits consumed (F)
when the fraction of outside equity is (1 - ct)V. U curves represent owner's indifference
curves between wealth and nonpecuniary benefit.

one dollar of current value of nonpecuniary benefits withdrawn
from the firm by the manager reduces the market value of the firm
by one dollar. The convex indifference curves36 (U, U 2 and U 3)
represent possibilities of the "true" tradeoff between pecuniary (firm
value) and nonpecuniary benefits-known only to the owner-manager himself.
Assume that U' belongs to the map of indifference curves and is
erroneously attributed to the owner-manager by the equity holders.
Thus, equity holders, attributing to the owner-manager preferences
that differ from his "true" tastes, will derive a biased estimate of the
36. Generally, the indifference curve is a graphic representation of the various combinations of two goods which yield the same level of satisfaction to the consumer. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 443-44. In this context the indifference curves represent the
combinations of the value of the firm (V) and the level of nonpecuniary benefits consumed (F)
which yield the same level of satisfaction to the controlling shareholder.
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change in F triggered by a reduction in the owner's share of the
firm.
When the manager is the sole owner, the value of the firm is V*
and the level of nonpecuniary benefits consumed is F*. Now, suppose the owner-manager (in need of cash to invest in a lucrative
newly discovered opportunity or to diversify) sells a fraction (1 a) of the firm (0 < ax < 1) to an outsider and retains for himself the
share a. 37 The cost to the owner-manager of consuming one dollar
of nonpecuniary benefits is now ax $1.
It is easy to show that the new equilibrium will be at the point
B, where the indifference curve U', believed by equity owners to
characterize the owner-manager's taste for nonpecuniary benefits, is
tangent to the line V P with slope - ax, such that B lies on the
budget line 38 VF. Equity holders will agree to pay (1 - ct) V',
where V' corresponds to the point B. The owner-manager is assumed to know that equity holders attribute to him indifference
curve U'. Therefore, if the tangency point were to the left of B on
VF, he will demand more than (1 - a)V' and, if the tangency
point is to the right of B, the equity holders will want to pay less
than (1 - co)V'.
Based on the adverse selection and information asymmetry argument, however, the manager's consumption of nonpecuniary benefits will be at the point F, corresponding to the value V, where V'
> V*. The total agency cost is thus V* - V*; however, the manager's share of the agency cost will be only V* - [cc V* + (1 a)V']. The manager's share is represented by the distance V* - V'
where OV' is composed of the segment F* G = c V* and the segment GE = (1 - a)V'. The outside equity holders will now bear a
portion of the agency cost amounting to (1 - a)(V' - V*). This
share is represented by the distance V' - V* = IK
JB. Actually, in this particular illustration, in spite of the residual loss to the
owner-manager of V* - V', he gains a net increment in welfare as
reflected in the distance V4 - V3, the difference between the intercepts on the Y axis of the two indifference curves U 3 and U1 . The
fact that the owner-manager experiences a net gain in welfare in
spite of his pecuniary residual loss is due to the increase in his consumption of nonpecuniary benefits (F*- F).
37. "C" represents the percentage of shares held by a shareholder, represented in decimal form.
38. The budget line represents and identifies all of the possible options from which can
be chosen the value of the firm (V) in relation to the level of nonpecuniary benefits (F) to be
consumed.
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The situation illustrated in Figure 1 represents an adverse selection potential.3 9 It is easy to draw the analogy with Akerlof's analysis of the market for "lemons."' Owner-managers would not have
an incentive to provide correct information about their tastes to potential purchasers of the firm's equity securities. The owner-manager will act like the seller of used cars in Akerlof's model: since
potential buyers do not have the information on the manager's
tastes for nonpecuniary benefits, the owner-manager has an incentive to sell poor quality securities because the return for good quality securities accrues mainly to the entire group and not to the
individual seller. In other words, the manager with a greater taste
for nonpecuniary benefits will be selling an inferior security-a
"lemon"-to a potential investor uninformed about this particular
manager's tastes. As a result, the average quality of securities sold
in the market will decrease as will the size of the market for
securities.
To see how the analogy with Akerlof's analysis holds, one need
merely substitute securities for used cars. The security of a company whose manager has little taste for nonpecuniary benefits
would resemble the "good car"; the security of a company whose
manager has a great taste for nonpecuniary benefits would resemble
the "bad car" or "lemon." Groups in society are characterized by a
utility that is a function of the quality of the securities. It is only
necessary to add the plausible assumption that utility functions of
different groups in society differ in the weight attached to security
quality and Akerlof's conclusions automatically follow. Clearly,
39. Adverse selection is defined here as the process by which a manager of a firm will
strive for personal economic efficiency and will base his decisions for the firm on these personal goals.
40. In Akerlof's model, he imagines that there are just four kinds of cars: new or used
and good or bad. The individuals in the market buy a new car without knowing it will be
good or a "lemon" (bad). The individuals know with probability q it is a good car and with
probability (l-q) it is a lemon (q is the proportion of good cars and (l-q) is the proportion of
lemons). After owning the car for a period of time, the owner has a good idea about the
quality of the car and thus can assign a new probability to whether his car is a lemon. This
estimate is more accurate than the initial estimate. An asymmetry in information has developed because the sellers now have more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers.
But, because buyers cannot tell the difference in quality, good cars and bad cars must sell at
the same price.
It is apparent that a used car cannot have the same valuation as a new car-if it did
have the same valuation, it would clearly be advantageous to trade a lemon at the
price of a new car, and buy another new car, at a higher probability of being good
and a lower probability of being bad.
Akerlof, supra note 34, at 489.
Thus, the owner of a good car is locked in; he cannot receive the true value of his car, nor
can he obtain the expected value of a new car. Thus, there is a market for lemons! Id.
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there are arrangements in the American capital market that minimize the adverse selection bias. As I argue below, one such arrangement is the regulation of the securities market by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the mandatory disclosure and filing requirements imposed on managers of publicly
held corporations.
If equity holders were able to estimate unbiasedly the manager's
response function, there would be a situation in which the information is symmetrical and the anomalies encountered in the case of
information asymmetry would not arise. The analysis of information asymmetry therefore leads to the conclusion that trades may
not occur in spite of the fact that there are given prices at which
some owner-managers would be willing to issue securities and at
which there would be buyers willing to purchase them. This happens due to the existence of poor quality securities that drive the
price below that at which the high quality security suppliers are
willing to sell. These adverse effects on trade may well have been
one of the underlying factors behind the establishment of the securities law and the regulation of information disclosure. The arguments underlying the disclosure rules and securities regulations
typically cite facilitation of trade and the building of public confidence in the securities market.4 1
Will private institutions come into being in an unregulated market to limit or even eliminate the adverse selection element inherent
in the agency relationship? We have seen that the cost of adverse
selection (or the cost of dishonesty) lies not only in the potential
amount by which a given purchaser is cheated, but also in driving
legitimate businesses out of existence. As in Akerlof's "lemons"
model, the presence of owner-managers who are willing to offer inferior goods "represents the major cost of dishonesty."'4 2 The pur41. President Franklin D. Roosevelt remarked about the Securities Act of 1933:
It [the Securities Act] puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It
should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence. The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business. This is but one step in our broad
purpose of protecting investors and depositors.
H.R. REP.No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2 (1933).
42. See Akerlof, supra note 34, at 495-96.
The presence of people in the market who are willing to offer inferior goods tends to
drive the market out of existence-as in the case of our automobile "lemons." It is
this possibility that represents the major cost of dishonesty-for dishonest dealings
tend to drive honest dealings out of the market.... The cost of dishonesty, there-

fore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also
must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.
Id at 495.
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chaser's problem is to identify the quality of the securities; that is,
the earning streams underlying those securities. In the agency costs
case, the purchaser's task is to identify the manager's response function to a reduction of his share in the ownership of the company.
One might expect private institutions to counter these adverse
selection effects. Such efforts would be consistent with the lobbying
for monitoring legislation, such as included in the Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934, and for the establishment of a government agency
such as the SEC that mandates specific categories of disclosure. In
the market for goods, Akerlof mentions some private institutions
such as prior guarantees, brand names, nationwide chains and licensing practices.43
In the corporate securities market, similar institutions exist to
ameliorate selection imperfections. One is the audit institution.
Managers with little taste for perquisites will want to advertise this
fact to potential shareholders in order to enhance the value of the
shares they issue. They will want neutrally objective auditors to
guarantee the truth of these assertions, especially at the expense of
false claims by rival corporate spendthrifts. Self-interest rather than
mandatory rules drives this hiring of auditors.
Purchasers must be assured of the value of these attestations.
Branding (differentiating one's service through training and other
activities that build reputation), establishing professional associations with the threat of revocation of the membership, granting
licenses which can be withdrawn, and setting standards, noncompliance with which would trigger review and rebuke, all represent arrangements designed to" enhance credibility in the audit process.
Without such arrangements, the auditors' pursuit of their own selfinterests may induce them to collaborate with the "poor quality"
management.
Management must also consider the litigation costs associated
with potential suits brought by stockholders, regulatory authorities
and others. For these penalties to be effective, however, the threat
of their enforcement must be real. The enforcement arm of the SEC
is now entrusted with this enforcement task. This particular regulatory function, therefore, may have been created to buttress the private, self-regulatory institutions spawned by the market's need to
minimize the costs of adverse selection.
43. Akerlof, supra note 34, at 499-500. Examples of nationwide chains are hotel and
restaurant chains. Licensing practices include the licensing of such groups as doctors, lawyers and barbers. Id. at 500.
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In addition to the hiring of auditors, a manager might attempt
to signal credibility through such mechanisms as increasing debt 44
or voluntary bonding through private contracts (such as a commitment to pay to the corporate till specified amounts if the manager
does not perform in accordance with his promises). The first signaling mode is costly, however, because of the increased agency cost of
debt. The second may not be sufficient to induce honest promises
and adequate performance. (Contractually specified penalties are
bounded by personal endowment, including human capital.)
Hence, signaling may not be as effective an arrangement for mitigating adverse selection as regulatory functions.
The market for professional managers, which monitors their
performance record to evaluate their skill and integrity for potential
future employments, has been cited as yet another effective mechanism for weeding out the incompetent and the cheat. 5 Will the anticipation of ex post settling up in the market for managers be a
sufficiently credible deterrent to mitigate adverse selective effects?4 6
Probably not. There is an abundance of managers with short term
horizons or who, anticipating retirement from professional management (and seeking haven in other countries!), may find that their
diversion of corporate assets more than offsets the long-term impact
of their reputation loss. The anticipation of such possibilities by
investors may militate against the elimination of adverse selection
effects.
To ensure the efficient operation of the private institutions that
emerge to minimize the adverse selection effects, enforcement procedures are necessary. The particular set of required procedures depends on the setting and the relative costs and benefits. Optimal
procedures may vary from country to country, depending upon economic, cultural, and other societal characteristics. Peer pressure
and withdrawal of recognition may suffice in some countries, but
regulation may be necessary in others. Careful cost-benefit analysis
is required before imposing a regulatory enforcement procedure.
Regulatory rule setting may not be the most efficient social arrangement to mitigate a particular market failure such as adverse selection in the issuance of securities. Economic analysts and other
theorists continue to search for more efficient social arrangements.
44. See Ross, The Determination of FinancialStructure: The Incentive-SignalingApproach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23, 27 (1977).
45. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON. 288, 29295 (1980).
46. See id. at 297-98.
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A normatively sensible and relatively efficient rule of law that is
to govern the sale of control transaction should be subjected to
these same efficiency criteria. The fiduciary duty principle of corporate law and the liabilities that can be imposed under the rules
and regulations promulgated by the SEC upon evidence of impropriety, dishonesty or "misleading" reporting can themselves be considered social arrangements created to minimize adverse selection
costs. I argue that the freedom to sell controlling interest to a third
person by a dominant shareholder potentially creates an adverse selection problem similar to the one introduced by the combination of
a passion for the consumption of nonpecuniary benefits and informative asymmetry in the market for first issues of securities.4 7
At this point, it is useful to note how relaxing the assumption of
information symmetry in the Jensen and Meckling analysis produces an importantly different characterization of the behavior of
the system. Under their analysis, every manager engages in an "efficient" consumption of nonpecuniary benefits and of monitoring and
bonding activities, consistent with his preferences and the pricing of
the securities he issues.4" Under my analysis, there are managers
who would transfer wealth to themselves from potential stockholders due to information asymmetry. The market would respond to
this possibility by setting deterrents that drive such "bad" managers
out of the market. The need for such deterrents is consistent with
the corporate and securities rules of law that we observe today.
In preparation for the second stage of the analysis-the impact
of sale of control- I introduce a change of terminology and broadening of the scope of the adverse selection phenomenon. First, the
manager's skills, i.e., his competence to do the job, should be introduced. The simplest way to do this is to redefine the horizontal axis
of Figure 1 to include the combined outcome to be measured in
terms of current value of benefits withdrawn from the firm by the
manager consuming the nonpecuniary benefits and the level of skill
the manager applies to his task. Thus, V is redefined to be the maximum value of the firm consistent with zero consumption of nonpecuniary benefits and the maximum possible level of skill. As we
move to the right on the horizontal axis, the consumption of nonpecuniary benefits increases or the skill level decreases. Any point on
the X axis thus will reflect a unique combination of skill level and
consumption of nonpecuniary benefits. Recognizing that (1) in ad47. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
48. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 319.
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dition to possessing superior information about their preferences for
nonpecuniary benefits, managers also possess superior information
about their skill level, and (2) managers lie on a continuum with
respect to the combined outcome of a decrease in the value of the
firm as a result of the combinations of skill and preference for nonpecuniary benefits that characterize them, the results of the analysis
with respect to the creation of adverse selection follow in their entirety without modification.
Second, at the cost of linguistic inaccuracy, I shall refer to the
combined outcome of skill and consumption of nonpecuniary benefits as "looting," as used by the pertinent case law.4 9 Thus, the X
axis of Figure 1 will be understood to measure the extent of "looting" (denoted by L). Note that loss of value due to incompetence is
subsumed under "looting" even though the loss does not result
from any "evil" intentions on the part of the manager. Any decrease of firm value, whether resulting from incompetence or from
consumption of nonpecuniary benefits, will be considered as "looting." These modifications set the groundwork for the second stage
of the analysis.
B.

The Impact of "Sale of Control"

I now leave the first stage behind: whatever market mechanisms
came into existence in the first stage, some equilibrium contingent
on the institutional arrangements will have emerged. A corporation
has been created and now exists. We take a leap in time and now
consider a mature corporation with a dominant shareholder owning
a controlling interest. Whatever combinations of managerial incentives were created by private contracts between owners and the
managers designated by the controlling shareholder, whatever the
statutory, regulatory or common law penalties imposed on management for impropriety, we expect to observe within this corporation an equilibrium amount of looting (denoted by L*). Also,
contingent on the existing institutional and judicial arrangements, it
is plausible to assume that the price at which the corporation stock
is traded reflects L*. Markets are expected to be semistrong efficient, and prices would reflect whatever information about L* may
become publicly available under existing disclosure rules, liabilities
49. See Koster v. Modification Systems, Inc., 731 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1984);
Doleman v. Meiji Mutual Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1984); Dan River, Inc.
v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983).
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for misrepresentation, audit procedures and other monitoring
mechanisms.
As indicated above, this equilibrium amount of looting, L*, reflects a particular combination of skill level (relative incompetence)
and consumption of nonpecuniary benefits. If the dominant shareholder sells his controlling interest to a third party, he simultaneously sells his opportunity to loot, and commands a premium
above market price to reflect the additional utility of consumption
of nonpecuniary benefits. Referring to Figure 1, suppose that the
"true" indifference map of the dominant controlling shareholder is
U', (that is, assume there is information symmetry between the
owners and manager regarding skill and preferences). Then, the total utility level of the dominant shareholder will be such that its
monetary equivalent equals the intercept of U' with the Y axis. The
difference between this intercept and V' will represent the minimum
premium the dominant shareholder will demand as consideration
for his controlling interest; that is, for his opportunity to loot. He
will not be willing to part with his controlling interest at the prevailing market price, which does not reflect the ability to loot and its
consequent higher level of utility. What about the potential purchaser? The premium he will be willing to pay depends on his particular skill and taste for nonpecuniary benefits. In this regard, one
must recognize that potential purchasers of control differ from each
other with respect to both their passion for nonpecuniary benefits
and their skill.5 0
A purchaser who is more skillful than the existing management
could (but need not necessarily) increase the value of the firm and
thus benefit noncontrolling shareholders even when the premium is
totally appropriated by the seller of control. Such a potential purchaser will necessarily improve the lot of noncontrolling shareholders if his utility function is such that he engages in an amount of
looting less than or equal to that perpetrated by existing management. Depending on his benefit-preference characteristics and the
degree to which his skill exceeds that of existing management, he
might improve the lot of noncontrolling shareholders even if he
consumed more nonpecuniary benefits than existing management.
Such a potential purchaser will be willing to pay a premium
which does not exceed the monetary equivalent of the increment in
utility he would enjoy as a result of the joint outcome of the value
50. Their skill is the maximum value they can attain for the firm if they were to consume
no nonpecuniary benefits.
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he can create (due to his superior skill) and his preferred consumption of nonpecuniary benefits. To the extent that the maximum premium the potential purchaser will be willing to pay for a controlling
interest exceeds the minimum premium the potential seller will demand, a voluntary, mutually beneficial transaction will emerge.
And, to the extent the purchaser either possesses superior skill or
consumes fewer nonpecuniary benefits, so that he creates more
value for noncontrolling shareholders than existing management,
all parties will benefit: there will be no need to demand that the
purchaser offer, or the seller secure, the same premium to noncontrolling shareholders.
Some aspects of this analysis have been captured by Easterbrook
and Fischel:
The sale of a control bloc of stock, for example, allows the buyer
to install his own management team, producing the same gains
available from a tender offer for a majority of shares but at lower
cost to the buyer. Because such a buyer believes he can manage
the assets of a firm more profitably, he is willing to pay a premium over the market price to acquire control. The premium
will be some percentage of the anticipated increase in value once
the transfer of control is effectuated. 5 '
But this is only part of the story. The increase in the market
value of the firm after the sale of controlling interest may be attributed not only to the superior skill of the purchaser in managing
assets, but also to a lower taste for nonpecuniary benefits (as compared to existing management). To the extent the potential purchaser consumes fewer nonpecuniary benefits than existing
management, the value of the firm will increase, and noncontrolling
shareholders will benefit even if the purchaser's skill is equal to (or
perhaps less than) that of existing management. Why, however,
will a potential purchaser be willing to pay the minimum premium
requested by the seller when he, in fact, engages in less looting than
the seller? It is conceivable that a purchaser with both lower skill
and lower preference for nonpecuniary benefits would be willing to
pay a premium for a controlling interest, for example, when the
mere ability to control or to hold a high executive office by virtue of
such control (such as serving as chairman of a prestigious and powerful board of directors) is a direct source of utility enhancement,
even without actual consumption of nonpecuniary benefits of the
kind that cause a decrease in the value of the firm.
51. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705
(1982).
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Easterbrook and Fischel seem to recognize this possibility: "In a
few instances changes in control may be attributable to self-aggrandizement of buyers rather than to gains in the use of the acquired
firms' assets." 52 However, if the passion for control is what the authors refer to as self-aggrandizement, it need not preclude the production of gains in the use of the acquired firm's assets. Such gains
can indeed come about by the consumption of fewer nonpecuniary
benefits. And even if the same level of nonpecuniary benefits is consumed as by existing management, noncontrolling shareholders
will suffer no loss as a result of the sale transaction.
We also must consider the case of potential buyers who have the
same or lower skill than existing management but for whom control
holds the lure of greater consumption of nonpecuniary benefits than
existing management. Such buyers will engage in a higher level of
looting than existing management and, hence, be "overlooters"
(their L exceeds L*). They also will be willing to pay a premium to
the extent that their rate of substitution between nonpecuniary benefits and monetary wealth yields a level of utility which exceeds the
utility foregone by the payment of premium to the seller. Once control is acquired, even one-time overlooters will cause a decrease in
the value of the firm and consequent losses to the noncontrolling
shareholders.
Of course, there are cases where controlling shareholders sell to
an overlooter 3 Sale to overlooters will cause redistribution of
wealth from noncontrolling shareholders to the purchaser and to
54
the seller.
Unlike the case in which securities are first issued by an ownermanager5 5 whereby potential purchasers of the securities can price
them appropriately to reflect their unbiased estimate of the nonpecuniary benefits the owner-manager will consume (assuming information symmetry between the owner-manager and the purchasers),
noncontrolling shareholders are not in a position automatically to
recoup their wealth loss through the market mechanism. Since they
already own the shares, they cannot avoid the loss suffered as a re52. Id. at 707.
53. See, eg., DeBaun v. First Western Bank and Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975).
54. The redistribution will be to the extent that the premium paid exceeds the equivalent
of the increment of utility the seller enjoyed prior to the sale, above the utility of the market
value of the shares.
55. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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sult of the decrease in the value of such holdings. Easterbrook and
Fischel argue:
At least for publicly-tradedfirms, the market offers information
that distinguishes value-increasing control transactions from
others in which looting and mismanagement may be in store. The
information is contained in the price of a firm's shares. If the control change is associated with an increase in price, the investors
apparently do not fear looting or other harm to the firm. If a
syndicate acquires a control bloc of shares, and the price of the
remainingshares rises, relative to the market as a whole, then the
shareholdersare betting on the basis of availableinformation that6
the new controller will be betterfor their interests than the old.1
There are two problems with this argument. First, the price of
the stock at the time of the control change will only reflect information publicly available at that time and the assessments as of that
date of the character and ability of the purchaser. But a potential
overlooter, who hides his intentions carefully, will not be "betrayed" in the stock price until the first news of his looting leaks to
the marketplace. Second, even if prices accurately reflect the intentions and future actions of the looter, noncontrolling shareholders
will have suffered the loss, regardless of how accurately reflected in
market prices, at the time of the sale of control.
The key question is whether such a sale should be prevented or
whether a requirement should be imposed that the premium offered
to the seller be shared by noncontrolling shareholders. We have
seen that overlooters may pay a premium above market price, in
light of the utility from overlooting they expect to derive, and that
noncontrolling shareholders can suffer a loss ex post. However, we
must consider the situation ex ante.
1. A Scenario of Information Symmetry
Consider the situation where no information is available in advance, either to the potential seller or to the noncontrolling shareholders, regarding the characteristics and skill of the potential
purchasers. Under such a scenario of information symmetry (actually, symmetry of ignorance), both the potential seller and the noncontrolling shareholders hold the same prior probability
distribution associated with the post-sale equilibrium combination
of firm value and looting. (The equilibrium points reflect pairs of
looting level and the corresponding value of the firm.) These
equilibriae are uniquely determined by the particular combinations
56. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 707 (italics in original).
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of skill and taste for nonpecuniary benefits that characterize the individual purchasers. If one is willing to assume sufficient diversity
among potential purchasers along a continuum of combinations of
skill and taste for nonpecuniary benefits (i.e., looting levels), it is not
difficult to see how such a probability distribution is induced. A
purchaser could either benefit or harm noncontrolling shareholders
depending on his particular looting potential.
With no specific knowledge of the purchaser's looting potential,
consider what happens when the distribution 7 characterizing the
outcomes in terms of the level of looting is symmetrical around a
mean which equals L*, the equilibrium level of looting under the
incumbent controlling shareholder. In other words, noncontroling
shareholders stand a fifty percent chance of either losing or benefiting from the sale of control to a purchaser on whom advance
knowledge does not exist. Of course, it might be argued that for
any particular corporation, the looting level L* associated with the
incumbents would be either below or above the mean of the perceived probability distribution of potential looting levels. But, ex
ante, and without advance knowledge, L* has a fifty percent chance
of being either above or below this mean so that, ex ante, the expected location of L* will be at the mean of the distribution. Under
the assumption of symmetry of information, this is the situation we
face ex ante,.when we ponder the desirability of imposing a sharing
rule with respect to the premium.
Assumptions about risk aversion of the noncontroling shareholders must be made. Assume first they are risk neutral. The level
of their expected utility neither increases nor decreases, ex ante, as a
result of the sale transaction since they are just as likely to gain as
they are to lose. But since a voluntary sale of control by the dominant shareholder to the purchaser necessarily implies that the expected utilities of both the seller and the purchaser would be weakly
increased, if increased at all, we must conclude under this scenario
that the sale of control constitutes a Pareto improvement: 58 noncontrolling shareholders remain as well off, either the purchaser or
the seller is strictly better off, and the other remains at least as well
off. Any rule that imposes sharing of the premium or that otherwise regulates the sale of control (such as outright prohibition, at
the extreme) will stifle and decrease the equilibrium number of such
57. The distribution in this model is perceived identically by potential seller and noncontrolling shareholders.
58. A Pareto-optimal solution is one of maximum economic efficiency. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 461-62.
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mutually beneficial exchanges, thereby constituting a Pareto inferior
state of affairs; overall economic efficiency would be decreased.
This analysis is different from Easterbrook and Fischel's. They
seem to assume that sale of controlling blocs would tend to be
mostly beneficial:
Sales of controlling blocs of shares provide a good example of
transactions in which the movement of control is beneficial. The
sale of control may lead to new offers, new plans, and new working arrangements with other firms that reduce agency costs and
create other gains from new business relationships. The premium price received by the seller of the control bloc amounts to
an unequal distribution of the gains. 9
They use this premise to justify the conclusion that sales at a premium should be lawful. My analysis, on the other hand, indicates
that sales of control are not necessarily beneficial to noncontrolling
shareholders. Nonetheless, sale at a premium should be lawful
without spreading the bounty because, ex ante, under the scenario I
depicted,6" the purchaser is just as likely to be an overlooter (L >
L*) as he is to be an underlooter (L < L*). The sale should be
lawful even when noncontrolling shareholders are harmed ex post.
The main point is that, ex ante, they are as well off in terms of
expected utility and either the seller or purchaser is strictly better
off, whereas the other is at least as well off.
My conclusion differs from Easterbrook and Fischel's again as
to what should be the proper formulation of a fiduciary principle.
They claim:
Investors' welfare is maximized by a legal rule that permits unequal division of gains from corporate control changes, subject to
the constraint that no investor be made worse off by the transaction. In essence, this is a straightforward
application of the
61
Pareto principle of welfare economics.
This principle can only be correct if it is interpreted as applicable ex
ante and not ex post. I would allow sale at a premium without a
sharing rule even if, ex post, noncontrolling shareholders are made
worse off-provided that ex ante they are not. But it is difficult to
see how, ex ante, the courts can verify that the shareholders would
be made worse off unless there is advance knowledge regarding the
characteristics of the purchaser. Thus, I must conclude that under
59. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 715-16.
60. Recall, the scenario I depicted is that risk-neutral noncontrolling shareholders,
along with the seller, are ignorant about the nature of the purchasers and perceive a distribution of looting potential that is symmetric around L* under the incumbents.
61. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 50, at 715.
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this first scenario, sale of control at a premium must be lawful.
And, as Easterbrook and Fischel observe, any rule restricting or
otherwise deterring such sales will stifle mutually beneficial exchanges and reduce efficiency.
But there exists yet another social cost which attends any rule
restricting sale of control under these circumstances. Entrepreneurowners, who embark on a new investment project for which they
might require financing from outside minority stockholders and
who anticipate that sale of their control would be restricted (or
made unprofitable) by a rule that forces them to spread the bounty
when they do encounter an opportunity to sell their control, will
find the initial investment project less attractive. The rule will decrease the present value of benefits gained from becoming an ownermanager, preserving control, and subsequently selling at a premium. Thus, in equilibrium, the total amount of such initial investments as well as sales of control, will decline. This amounts to a
social cost in that it will decrease the equilibrium volume of entrepreneurial activities with positive net social value.62
Suppose we relax the assumption of risk neutrality of the noncontrolling shareholders. Will this alter the conclusion? No. If
noncontrolling shareholders are risk averse, their expected utility,
ex ante, will decrease with respect to their stockholdings in the corporation if control is sold under the above scenario. However, they
can minimize this unsystematic risk by holding sufficiently diversified portfolios of securities. Moreover, such an anticipated decrease
in expected utility will have been considered in the calculation of
costs and benefits that investors engaged in when they initially decided whether to buy the securities. For example, under the Jensen
and Meckling analysis,6 3 upon the first issuance of securities by
owner-managers, potential purchasers will discount the anticipated
future loss in utility contingent on future sales of control, and will
bid a price for the securities that will appropriately reflect the present value of expected losses. When the initial owners later sell their
securities, the prices at which the securities trade will again reflect
the expected decrements in the utility that the buyers anticipate will
be suffered when controlling shareholders sell their interest to third
parties. Thus, the prevailing prices of securities will reflect the implications of risk aversion for the loss in expected utility upon sales
of control. In other words, prevailing prices of securities are ex62. This social cost is not mentioned by Easterbrook and Fischel.
63. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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pected to be such that, ex ante, there will be no actual loss in expected utility when control is sold: the price already reflects the
anticipated loss.
2.

A Scenario of Information Asymmetry

So far, we have assumed that both noncontrolling shareholders
and the selling dominant shareholder are equally ignorant about
characteristics of potential purchasers. But is there room for improvement? For example, can we produce more efficiency by weeding out the overlooters with attempts to increase the probability
that sales of control would only be made to the underlooters (those
more skillful or with lesser taste for nonpecuniary benefits)? This
could produce a more efficient resource allocation in that assets will
eventually be employed by those who are able to employ them most
efficiently. But how could we discriminate in advance between the
more and the less skillful, between those with a greater tendency to
consume nonpecuniary benefits and those with the lesser?
Such discrimination (not necessarily perfect) can only be made
if information about potential purchasers is produced. But we face
a dilemma: the first individual to know the identity of the potential
purchaser is the seller himself. The seller would be unwilling to
produce much information about the potential purchaser because
information production is costly and does not privately benefit the
seller. He will receive the agreed upon premium one way or the
other: the information could only benefit the noncontrolling shareholders. We thus have a classical moral hazard situation.' Here,
"information production" about the potential purchaser replaces
"effort" in the typical relation between a principal and an agent.
The potential seller (agent) is averse to the costly production of information which would benefit noncontrolling shareholders (principal) by decreasing the likelihood of selling control to an overlooter.
However, unlike the typical relation between principal and
agent, that between noncontrolling shareholders and the dominant
shareholder does not conveniently allow the former to induce the
latter to be party to an incentive contract that would minimize disincentives to produce information. In the traditional principal64. Such a situation arises when individuals engage in risk sharing "such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome." This situation will
not induce proper incentive for taking correct actions and thus, Pareto-optimal risk sharing is
precluded. Instead, only a second-best solution can be achieved by trading off some risksharing benefits for provision of incentives. Holstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10
BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979).
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agent situation, the agent accepts the contract because his minimum
required level of expected utility will be attained as a result of becoming a party to the contract. Furthermore, the principal is the
one who defines the employment task for the agent.6" The relation
between noncontrolling shareholders and the dominant shareholder
is different. Noncontrolling shareholders have nothing to dangle
before the dominant shareholder to induce him to be party to an
incentive contract that would guarantee a "second best solution"
for the decision to produce information about a potential purchaser.6 6 Hence, the dominant shareholder will produce sub-optimal information: the setting does not make possible the relatively
efficient mechanism of private contracting to reduce moral hazard.
Some information will be produced, for, after all, the seller must
ascertain the financial creditworthiness of the potential purchaser to
assure collection of the consideration for the control he is selling.
But this relatively cheap, minimal information will not typically enable discrimination between overlooters and underlooters. Information revealing such distinctions would be both imperfect and
costly to obtain.
The dominant shareholder's (agent's) effort in the production of
information about the potential purchaser is unobservable by noncontrolling shareholders (principal). The eventual level of looting is
a function of this effort and the subsequent decision by the dominant shareholder to sell or not sell, and the characteristics of the
potential purchaser (viewed here as uncontrollable or random).
Therefore, the condition for a "first best solution" (optimal risk
sharing) within a principal-agent context can suggest potential remedies. As discussed below, such potential remedies will not be effective in the case of sale of control.
First, consider the observability of effort. If effort (production
of information) were to be made observable, an optimal risk-sharing
rule (first best solution)6 7 would become possible. But as we have
seen above, this remedy is ruled out by the inability to contract
privately.68
Another possibility also proves to be ineffective. It may be intuitively appealing to contemplate the shifting of the effort from the
dominant shareholder (who does not privately benefit from the effort) to the noncontrolling shareholders (who do benefit from it)
65.
66.
67.
68.

See
See
See
See

id. at 83-85.
id. at 85-86.
Borch, Equilibrium in a ReinsuranceMarket, 30 ECONMETRICA 424 (1962).
supra text accompanying note 66.
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and thus "internalize" the information production activity and attain a locally optimal level. Since the starting position is one of
information asymmetry (the seller knows first the purchaser's identity and possible financial creditworthiness), the imbalance of this
initial information must be corrected before a shifting of incremental information production to noncontrolling shareholders becomes
possible.
Therefore, visualize a rule whereby before a potential sale, the
seller is obligated to disclose all of the information he possesses
about the purchaser to the noncontrolling shareholders.6 9 The latter will decide individually or collectively70 on the optimal investment in information production (possibly zero), so as to ascertain
whether the purchaser is a potential overlooter. As a result of this
investigation, they will form an assessment of the purchaser's looting potential. They then will be able to optimally decide whether
they are better off deterring the dominant shareholder from selling
by offering him the same premium he otherwise could obtain from
the purchaser. The noncontrolling shareholders will be willing to
offer such a premium if they expect the saving gained by driving
away the overlooter will exceed the premium they would have to
pay to the seller.
The problem this potential remedy poses is that it provides an
incentive for the seller to collaborate with an overlooter. The seller
would agree with the overlooter on a high premium which the latter
would not necessarily wish to pay. Also, the seller would provide
sufficiently incriminating (and true) information to the noncontrolling shareholders about the purchaser. Upon investigation, the noncontrolling shareholders would correctly assess the purchaser as an
overlooter and would be willing to pay the high premium to the
seller in order to drive away the "bad" purchaser. The suggested
remedy could therefore degenerate into a "get rich" scheme for the
dominant shareholder even if he could implement it only once.
Remedies based on a "second best solution,""1 in terms of the
principal-agent model through private contracting, also can be elusive. The function of a second best incentive contract in this case is
69. No market incentives exist which would induce such a disclosure without a specific
rule.
70. This would work better in a closely-held corporation where the cost of organizing as
a group is likely to be low.
71. The theory of second best is that if one or more of the Pareto-optimal conditions
cannot be satisfied, it is not generally desirable to force compliance with the remaining
Pareto-optimal conditions. In general, the conditions of Pareto-optimality are not required in
order to attain a second best solution. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 504 n.1, 524 n.1.
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to induce a second best optimal investigation of a potential purchaser (by the seller) before the decision as to whether to sell. This
second best solution requires a rule whereby the seller's own fortune
will vary with the outcome of his sale of control (i.e., the level of
looting). Ideally, the contract would reward the seller if the purchaser turns out to be an underlooter, and penalize the seller if the
purchaser turns out to be an overlooter. Both rewards and penalties
would vary directly with the degree of under- or overlooting. But
contracts must be enforceable to be effective. The fiduciary duty
principle of corporate law would have to be replaced by one that
facilitates the enforcement of private contracts designed to induce
optimal behavior regarding the investigation of a purchaser and the
decision to sell. Such private contracts ideally would take into account several things: (1) the dominant shareholder's characteristics
as to risk aversion and taste for nonpecuniary benefits; (2) endowment; that is, personal wealth, including human capital; (3) noncontrolling shareholders' preferences and tastes; and (4) potential
benefits from-and the opportunities for-selling to an overlooter,
which may depend on the nature of the business, the liquidity of
assets, and similar things.
However, except for closely-held corporations in which costs of
organizing and contracting are apt to be low, the relatively complicated and expensive process necessary to draw agreements between
noncontrolling shareholders and the dominant shareholder could
make this remedy less attractive. Moreover, under current law, implicit contractual arrangements (fiduciary duties) are left to the interpretation of the courts and not to the parties concerned. Thus, at
least for the time being, we have to do without the remedy of private contracting.
Without contractual remedies, this unresolved moral hazard situation, combined with information asymmetry regarding the identity of the purchaser (known to the seller but not to the
noncontrolling shareholder), may skew the distribution of potential
looting levels as perceived by the noncontrolling shareholders. A
higher probability will be attached to overlooting than to underlooting. The seller has no incentive to search for an underlooter
whereas any premium could induce him to sell to an overlooter.
Thus, with the introduction of the reality of information asymmetry
and moral hazard, we find that the distribution of potential looting
may no longer be symmetric about L*, and, ex ante, noncontrolling
shareholders may expect to lose on a sale of control transaction.
This anticipated redistribution of wealth from noncontrolling share-
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holder to purchaser and seller will cause a loss in economic efficiency. Moreover, the market pricing of the original issue will
reflect only an anticipated no-better-than-average willingness to investigate, even if the distribution is perceived to be symmetrical
around L*, and this price will be less than that sought by a seller
who is indeed willing to more thoroughly investigate. This manifestation of adverse selection is elaborated below.
3. Adverse Selection Revisited: The "Trickle Down"
The analysis of subsection A must be revisited. That subsection
involved initial corporation formation and financing. The information asymmetry and moral hazard-induced distribution of potential
looting will set in motion an adverse selection process that takes
place, anticipatively, when the entrepreneur-owner-manager incorporates and attempts to finance his investment project. 72 A sort of
"trickle-down" adverse selection would be operative. Some description of the possible scenario may provide clarity.
Suppose that the potential seller of control is the original entrepreneur-owner-manager who wishes to sell securities publicly to finance his investment project. Since entrepreneur-owner-managers
are potential sellers of their own control, they could differ in their
tendency to investigate potential purchasers and in their eagerness
to deter overlooters from purchasing their control. In addition to
evaluating the probability of enterprise failure, the potential buyer
of securities therefore will not only have to assess the entrepreneurowner-manager's taste for nonpecuniary benefits and competence
(looting potential), but also their degree of willingness to discriminate between overlooters and underlooters and their willingness to
refrain from selling to an overlooter. I refer to this willingness in
both respects as "fairness."
It is thus plausible to expect the "fairer" entrepreneur-ownermanagers to engage in bonding activities so that they can assure the
potential purchasers of their securities that they will thoroughly investigate potential purchasers of their control. Otherwise, they may
not be able to sell their securities at a price reflecting such willingness to investigate in the future. Furthermore, as in the case of the
market for "lemons," 7 3 public offerings of securities may diminish
and otherwise socially profitable investments would not be undertaken due to lack of financing. Therefore, the "fairer" potential
72. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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dominant shareholders may be expected to welcome a rule of law
facilitating orderly capital markets in which they could sell securities to finance their entrepreneurial projects.
Thus, potential noncontrolling shareholders, cognizant that no
liability is imposed on the seller, may be unwilling to purchase securities at a price desired by entrepreneur-owner-managers. As the
analysis in subsection A concluded, adverse selection-here with respect to the "fairness" of the potentially dominant shareholderwill decrease the equilibrium number of socially useful investments.
What rule of law should be installed to mitigate this adverseselection-trickle-down effect? The general rule underlying the principal-agent incentive contract solution7 4 could be applied. As noted
above, noncontrolling shareholders (viewed as the principal) seem
precluded from contracting with the dominant shareholder to force
optimal investigation in selling decisions.7 5 However, reformulation
of the fiduciary duty principle can be used to fill the vacuum and to
attain an approximation to a second best solution. The potential
seller must share in the negative impact an overlooter would produce in a fashion analogous to an agent receiving compensation depending on the outcome of his unobservable effort. In our case, a
dominant shareholder would be liable for ex post damages or a
share thereof, if the purchaser mismanages or otherwise overloots
the corporation's assets after the sale of control.
If the seller's liability for overlooting is correctly specified, the
dominant shareholder will optimally investigate the potential purchaser and decide whether to sell, in the "second best" sense. Of
course, the seller's liability for ex post damages will depend on the
personal characteristics of the seller as well as the characteristics of
noncontrolling shareholders. Because it is impossible in advance to
formulate a principle of fiduciary duty that is custom-tailored to
every potential seller, a formula would have to be determined on a
case-by-case basis.7 6
Further improvement in this rule is possible. Any information
that can be obtained at no cost, or relatively low cost, about the
agent's effort (investigation of the purchaser by the dominant shareholder) can produce a superior solution from the standpoint of in74. See generally Harris & Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information, 20 J. ECON. THEORY 231 (1979).
75. See supra text accompanying note 66.
76. Note the difficulty of distinguishing among bad luck, incompetence and self-serving
consumption of nonpecuniary benefits.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

centives to investigate.7 7 Thus, the rule of law should stipulate that
the seller can reduce or eliminate his liability for ex post damages by
proving that he reasonably investigated the characteristics of the
purchaser before deciding to transfer his controlling interest.
To further drive away overlooters, stiff sanctions could be imposed on the purchaser for some period after the sale of control
transaction. Such sanctions could provide an effective deterrent if
the overlooting purchaser is sufficiently wealthy78 or if the sanctions
can erode human capital, including the value of personal freedom
(such as imprisonment).
Should noncontrolling shareholders bear part of the risk? Since
the actual resolution of any suit brought before the courts by noncontrolling shareholders is uncertain, they will share in some of the
risk. Indeed, I believe such risk sharing is preferable-to induce
investigation of their investments. If they were not to share in any
of the risk (e.g., by being protected by a rule that requires the purchaser or seller to offer to buy their shares at the same premium),
they essentially would be protected from errors in identifying quality entrepreneurs. Unshared risk would eliminate their incentive to
investigate the soundness of their investments. Further, such protection would induce noncontrolling shareholders to underinvest in
their own education and sophistication in financial and business
matters.
To summarize, the seller should be totally or partially liable for
damages caused by mismanagement or overlooting by the purchaser, maybe for a specified period of time after the sale. The
seller's ability to demonstrate reasonable prior investigation of the
purchaser should allow him total or partial relief from liability. Imposing stiff sanctions on the purchaser upon evidence of overlooting
may be desirable to deter would-be overlooters from purchasing
control. Noncontrolling shareholders would also be exposed to
some risk. While they could bring an action against the sellers upon
evidence of overlooting, they would be uncertain of the outcome
due to the seller's reasonable investigation defense and the inherent
arbitrariness of the judicial system.
Certainly, the Canadian rule,7 9 that any premium agreed upon
77. See Holstrom, supra note 64, at 87 ("any informative signal, regardless of how noisy
it is, will have positive value... if costlessly obtained .... "). For a discussion of the effects
of information within the principal-agent relationship, see generally Shavell, Risk Sharing
and Incentives in the Principaland Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
78. Wealth is an effective bond for a risk-averse purchaser.
79. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
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between seller and purchaser must also be offered to noncontrolling
shareholders, is economically inefficient. It deters mutually beneficial control-sale transactions by driving away the underlooters
(along with the overlooters) and entrepreneur-owner-managers who
would otherwise embark on productive :ventures. Such a rule also
insures noncontrolling shareholders against any misjudgments
when making investments and, thus, will induce them to obtain less
information about their investments and to underinvest in their own
education and sophistication in matters of finance and investments.
Welfare flavored arguments for protecting the "poor, old and
ignorant" against the disasters of bad investment can be more effectively and cheaply dealt with by instituting rich and complete capital markets that offer secure, as well as risky, investments. The
"ignorant" who choose not to be informed about the subtleties of
risk and return should avoid hazardous paths. If the emphasis of
the argument is on the "poor" rather than the "ignorant," the answer is better found in direct welfare transfers where social cost can
be more explicitly measured and considered. Legal protection for
the poor or the ignorant against bad investments constitutes an indirect subsidy of a magnitude that is largely immeasurable and thus
eludes the calculus of social cost and benefit. Potential "free rides"
also offer opportunities for political entrepreneurship. If able to effectively organize, actual and potential noncontrolling shareholders
would likely lobby for the legislation of premium sharing rules such
as those in Canada. Arguments would be phrased in terms of enhancing market confidence and facilitating trade. However, while
a premium sharing rule may indeed facilitate trade and enhance
market confidence, the price paid- deterrence of beneficial transactions and entrepreneurial ventures-may well be too high.
The general rule that the seller, absent adequate prior investigation, should be liable for a purchaser's overlooting, is normatively
desirable and close to the case law in the United States. In the next
section, a few exceptions to this general rule in the American cases
are briefly discussed.
III.

SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE NORMATIVE RULE IN
AMERICAN CAsE LAW

It must be noted that American case law closely approximates
the normative rule. For example, it has been stated: "[I]t has long
been settled law that, absent looting of corporate assets, conversion
of a corporate opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith, a con-
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trolling stockholder is free to sell, and a purchaser is free to buy,
that controlling interest at a premium price." 8 However, there are
a few instances of departure from the normative rule.
A.

The Duty of Reasonable Investigation

A departure from the normative rule occurs in the stipulation
that the seller is obligated to investigate the purchaser when there is
reason to believe that the purchaser intends to loot or mismanage.
This diverges from my conclusion that there should be an implicit
obligation to investigate the purchaser, inasmuch as the investigation would serve as a defense to an action for sale to an overlooter.
Courts seem to impose an obligation to investigate only if there is
reason to suspect the purchaser to be an overlooter. In Treadway
Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., the court stated: "Cowin himself
would have had an obligation to investigate Care if, contrary to the
findings made in this case, Cowin were selling control of Treadway
and there were reason to believe Care intended to loot or mismanage
Treadway...

,'81 (emphasis added).

Other cases also seem to make the obligation contingent on
prior cause of suspicion. For example, in DeBaun v. First Western
Bank & Trust Co., the court held:
[t]hat duty of good faith and fairness encompasses an obligation
of the controlling shareholder in possession of facts "[s]uch as to
awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his guard [that a
potential buyer of his shares may loot the corporation of its assets to pay for the shares purchased].., to conduct a reasonable
and adequate investigation [of the buyer]." 82
The court developed this argument leaving little doubt that the obligation to investigate is contingent upon prior suspicion-creating
information:
Here Bank was the controlling majority shareholder of Corporation. As it was negotiating with Mattison, it became directly
aware of facts that would have alerted a prudent person that
Mattison was likely to loot the corporation ....

Armed with

knowledge of those facts, Bank owed a duty to Corporation and
its minority shareholders to act reasonably with83respect to its
dealings in the controlling shares with Mattison.
80. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685, 397 N.E.2d 387, 388, 421
N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (1979).
81. 638 F.2d 357, 377 (2d Cir. 1980).
82. 46 Cal. App. 3d 696, 699, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (1975).
83. Id. at 697, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 360. For a similar analysis, see Clagett v. Hutchison,
583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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A rule such as I recommend, enabling a seller to avoid liability
for subsequent overlooting upon demonstration that he investigated
reasonably, will induce the seller to investigate purchasers more extensively than a rule which imposes on the seller the obligation of
thorough investigation and of refraining from sale of his control
only upon possession of suspicion-creating information. While in
legal practice the two formulations may make little difference except in fringe cases, a proper formulation is likely, in general, to
induce more optimal investigation.
Surely, the seller could stumble upon information about looting
potential as a by-product of collecting information about the purchaser's creditworthiness. Such indeed were the circumstances in
DeBaun, in which the court concluded that "in those circumstances
the majority shareholder owes a duty of reasonable investigation
and due care to the corporation." 84 A duty of reasonable investigation exists "when [the majority shareholder is] possessed of facts
establishing a reasonable likelihood that the purchaser intends to
exercise the control to be acquired by him to loot the corporation of
its assets." 5
This case law rule can be counterproductive: the imposition on
the seller of a duty of reasonable investigation once he possesses
information creating suspicion that the purchaser will be a looter
depresses the seller's incentive to produce information. Before producing information about the purchaser, we can assume that an investigation (even the most superficial) will indicate equal likelihood
that the potential purchaser is either an overlooter or an underlooter 8 6 Suppose the law imposes a duty to investigate further.
Further investigation would entail incurring additional cost, introducing additional uncertainty, and result in the ultimate decision
not to sell if the information produced indicates the purchaser
might be an overlooter. This rule reduces the ex ante expected benefits of preliminary information production and thus depresses the
incentive to produce such information. Such a duty to investigate if
in possession of suspicion-creating information either encourages
activities designed to efficiently hide information readily available
privately to the seller, or deters the seller from producing any potentially negative preliminary information. A seller interested in ascertaining a purchaser's creditworthiness will only gather
information for that purpose, avoiding accidental discovery of infor84. DeBaun, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
85. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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mation that could obligate him to incur additional costs through
further investigation. Judge Friendly noted the inadequacy (but not
necessarily the undesirability which I emphasized above) of imposing liability on the seller only upon evidence of prior knowledge of
the purchaser's looting potential and intentions. As Judge Friendly
stated, "[t]o hold the seller for delinquencies of the new directors
only if he knew the purchaser was an intending looter is not a sufficient sanction." 8 7
Perlman v. Feldmann8 8 may be seen as a departure from the
general case law and from the normative rule developed above.
However, this case did not seem to impact subsequent cases; thus
the general case law prevails. 9
B.

Sale of Office

This economic analysis of the sale of control transaction should
apply with equal force to the sale of corporate office or management
control, even when unaccompanied by sufficient transfer of shares
to guarantee voting control. However, contrary to my conclusions,
American case law seems to distinguish between sale of control of
shares and sale of management control unaccompanied by transfers
of shares.
The court in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates stated:
It is established beyond question under New York law that it is
illegal to sell corporate office or management control by itself
(that is, accompanied by no stock or insufficient stock to carry
voting control).
...

The same rule apparently applies in all jurisdictions where

the question has arisen.
...

The rationale of the rule is undisputable: persons enjoying

management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders, and therefore may not regard it as their own personal
property to dispose of as they wish.90
This was also referred to in Caplan v. Lionel Corp., in which the
court stated:
87. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1962).
88. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). In Perlman, despite the fact that the dominant shareholder had no reason to believe the purchaser would injure the corporation, the dominant
shareholder was held accountable. Id. at 178, 179. The court emphasized the high standard
of care which the controlling shareholder (who was also president and chairman of the board
of directors) owed to the minority shareholders. Id. at 174, 178.
89. Id. at 178 (Swan, J., dissenting) ("I think that both the legal profession and the
business world will find the decision confusing and will be unable to foretell the extent of its
impact upon customary practices in the sale of stock.").
90. Essex, 305 F.2d at 575.
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The underlying principle is that the management of a corporation is not the subject of trade and cannot be bought apart
from actual stock control .... Where there has been a transfer of

the majority of the stock, or even such a percentage as gives
working control, a change
91 of directors by resignation and filling
of vacancies is proper.
Presumably, the premium paid on transactions of transfer of
corporate office would not be as high as the premium paid for a sale
of controlling ownership interests. Dissatisfied controlling shareholders can eventually wrest control from the purchasers of such
corporate office. The price paid by the purchaser of a corporate
office will reflect the nonpecuniary benefits associated with the corporate office.92 The ability of a manager holding a corporate office
to sell such office to his benefit would be relevant in deciding how
much nonpecuniary benefit to consume and how much to enhance
efficiency of operations. Depriving him of the opportunity to sell
his office at a premium decreases his incentive to be efficient. Furthermore, this deprivation decreases the number of mutually beieficial transactions (beneficial to shareholders as well as the purchaser)
in which purchasers of corporate office can manage more efficiently
than incumbents. The possibility that some purchasers may be
overlooters can be countered by the same remedies suggested above
for the sale of control. 93 Thus, I believe the analyses of sale of control and of sale of corporate office are identical and lead to the same
conclusion.
IV.

SOME LEGAL THEORIES GovERNING SALE
OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS

Two major legal doctrines have emerged to justify imposition of
a duty on the purchaser or seller of a controlling interest to offer
noncontrolling shareholders a similar premium. The first doctrine
is predicated on the theory that "control" is a corporate asset, the
sale of which must be paid to the corporate till.9 4 The second doctrine is that of equal opportunity. 95 Both doctrines preceded the
now popular agency theory of the firm. 96 The two doctrines are
addressed in sequence.
91. 20 A.D.2d 301, 303, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1964).
92. See supra note 5.
93. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
94. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22, 48 (1963).
95. See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale ofShares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965).
96. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5.
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The CorporateAsset Theory

For Bayne, the argument that control is a corporate asset is tantamount to arguing that all shareholders should share in the opportunity to sell their shares at the higher price offered to the
controlling shareholder.9 7 Since presumably the premium belongs
to all the shareholders, the premium impliedly belongs to the corporation. But that in turn implies that the premium is for the office
and since the office belongs to the corporation, "control" is a corporate asset.98 This theory would assert that powers over corporate
affairs can only be exercised for the corporation's benefit, not to be
sold for private profit. In other words, powers over corporate affairs are powers held in trust for the corporation.
There are three major problems with this theory. The first is
definitional: What does it mean to say that the power associated
with an office is a corporate asset? The power to affect corporate
affairs, after all, is used to create corporate assets or to enhance
their value. Thus, if the power to manage corporate affairs is used
judiciously and with acumen, then additional and more valuable
corporate assets such as cash, marketable securities, physical property and goodwill will be created. On the other hand, if the power
to manage is misused or not used skillfully, the result would be dissipation of corporate assets. Thus, power over corporate affairs is
merely the authority necessary for management to enable it to create corporate assets. The power itself cannot be an asset; it is only
the means by which management can create, or dissipate, assets.
The second problem involves properly identifying the asset's nature and its owner. The asset is the ability to consume corporate
resources in the form of nonpecuniary benefits and it is paid for,
initially, by the entrepreneur-owner-manager when issuing securities to the public. As detailed in Section II, the ability to derive
utility from consuming nonpecuniary benefits is "paid for" by the
owner-manager through receiving a lower price for the securities
issued.99 This lower price reflects the discount demanded by investors to compensate them for the anticipated consumption of nonpecuniary benefits. When the entrepreneur-owner-manager then sells
his controlling interest, the new controlling shareholder would pay
for this asset in the form of a premium and would thus become the
97. Bayne, supra note 94, at 67.
98. Id. at 65.
99. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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new owner of the controlling interest and the consequent benefit of
the utility derived from consumption of nonpecuniary benefit.
Andrews sensed this difficulty when he reasoned that if control,
which initially is a corporate asset, was bought, the new owner
should be able to resell the asset he paid for at whatever price he is
able to obtain."° The analysis of Section II shows why this dilemma arose. It demonstrates how control never becomes a corporate asset to begin with: the initial entrepreneur-owner owns the
asset, which he paid for by receiving fewer proceeds than he would
have if he yielded his control. To view control as a corporate asset
for which noncontrolling shareholders should be paid when the asset is sold amounts to the controlling shareholder paying twice for
the same "asset."
To demonstrate the third difficulty, assume that control is indeed a corporate asset. Control should be reflected in prevailing
market prices since, within a semistrong efficient market, any information on the power to control corporate affairs would be expected
to be known and thus impounded in market prices. Under this interpretation, the premium paid to a controlling shareholder for the
sale of his control would not reflect this corporate asset (whose
value is already impounded in market prices), but some other possibly hidden asset, the existence of which is known only by the selling
shareholder and the purchaser who agree on the premium to be
paid for it. But, in this case, the premium would reflect an asset
that already existed in the corporation. Knowledge of this asset
would eventually come to light, thus inducing an increase in the
market price of the corporation's shares (including those owned by
noncontrolling shareholders).
In this case, noncontrolling shareholders will benefit from this
hidden asset once it is revealed. In fact, the sale of control transaction itself will make the asset's existence come to light sooner and
will thus increase the market price of the corporation's shares.
Viewed in this fashion, the sale of control is a trigger that flushes
out inside knowledge about the hidden assets. This, in turn, benefits
noncontrolling shareholders.
B.

The Equal Opportunity Doctrine

As presented by Andrews, the equal opportunity doctrine is
based on the view that all holders of shares in a corporation are in
some sense equal and, therefore, should be provided equal opportu100. Andrews, supra note 95, at 538-39.
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nity to sell shares (or a pro rata part thereof) on substantially the
same terms as a controlling shareholder.' 0 ' Easterbrook and Fischel skillfully disposed of this argument." 2 Their counterargument: a rule that obligates seller or purchaser to offer the same
opportunity to sell at a premium to noncontrolling shareholders
may provide equal opportunity ex post but it would be unfair ex
ante. Due to such a rule, either the seller or the purchaser is likely
to find it unattractive to consummate the transaction, thus depriving noncontrolling shareholders of potential benefits. Thus, the ex
post inequality of distribution becomes both fair and desirable because without it, the beneficial transaction would not occur.
I wish to add only one observation. The ex ante rule advanced
by Easterbrook and Fischel is the appropriate one. However, it
should be applied much earlier than when the "lottery" created by
the sale of control transaction is being considered. Even if the lottery were to result in a negative expected value to noncontrolling
shareholders, the ex post possibility of such a lottery taking place
would have been considered ex ante when noncontrolling shareholders first acquired their shares knowing that controlling interest
could be sold to a new team.
As the analysis in Section II indicates, the whole distribution of
such lotteries would be anticipated before shareholders agree to finance the entrepreneur-owner-manager's enterprise. At that earlier
point in time, the shareholders had an equal opportunity to become
entrepreneur-owner-managers or passive shareholders. Choice of
the former could hold promise for large rewards, challenge, initiative, and entrepreneurial risk (the threat of entrepreneurial bankruptcy in the sense of not being able to survive as entrepreneur);
choice of the latter would offer the more modest return but also the
lower entrepreneurial risk. When noncontrolling shareholders were
only potential investors they had the equal opportunity to choose
between controlling and influencing, or becoming residual claimants with neither control nor influence. Just as any individual has
the free choice to become an entrepreneur or a laborer, preferences,
endowments and constraints will determine the selection.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article addressed whether a controlling shareholder should
be free to sell his controlling interest at a premium without a legal
101. Id. at 515.
102. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51, at 708-11.
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obligation to secure the offer of the premium to noncontrolling
shareholders. The analysis was conducted with the background of a
contrast between the case law in the United States and the statutory
law in Canada. While in Canada potential purchasers of a controlling interest are encumbered by the obligation to offer the same opportunity to noncontrolling shareholders of the target corporation,
in the United States-with the exception of cases of consequent
looting-purchasers and sellers of controlling interests are free from
such encumbrances.
The bulk of the paper was devoted to an economic analysis of
the sale of control transaction. Pointing out how the sale of control
can set an adverse selection process in motion, I concluded that the
rule of American case law is, with some exceptions, economically
efficient: 0 3 the dominant shareholder is free to sell his controlling
interest at a premium, but he should be held liable for damages
caused by consequent looting of the purchaser.
My interpretation of the appropriate fiduciary duty principle
differs from the case law in that I conclude that the seller should be
offered relief if he demonstrates reasonable investigation of the purchaser in the case of consequent looting. Under existing case law,
he is obligated to reasonably investigate only if he already possesses
information that indicates the likelihood of the purchaser being an
overlooter. Once he has investigated, he should refrain from selling
his controlling interest if the investigation of the purchaser indicates
that the purchaser will overloot.
Existing legal doctrines offered in support of an obligation to
provide opportunity to noncontrolling shareholders to sell at the
same terms as the dominant shareholder were reviewed and found
lacking.
A concept of "fairness" is often cited to justify the equal oppor103. Bailey and Crawford accept the conclusion, but discount its significance. They state:
Economists and legal commentators who oppose the regulation of private acquisition of control essentially argue that shares are a form of private property which
should be freely transferable without regulatory restraints to protect minority shareholders. The theoretical rationale of those who support this point of view is that
economic efficiency will be facilitated if there are no regulatory restraints since corporate control transactions are beneficial not only to the subject corporation but
also to the economy in general.
Bailey & Crawford, supra note 4, at 5-6.
Later in their analysis, Bailey and Crawford take issue with the import of this efficiency
and state that they are "unpersuaded by economic arguments that a control premium should
not be shared with minority shareholders in order to facilitate economic efficiency. Indeed, in
Canada, an equal treatment rule appears to be necessary to maintain investor confidence in
the public markets." Id. at 65.
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tunity which has led to Canadian legislation requiring that an opportunity to sell should be offered to all shareholders and not only
to the dominant shareholder. Also, a belief that such legislation
will enhance market confidence and thus facilitate trading could
have been a factor."° Despite wide exposure to the development of
American case law, we thus see a divergent course taken by the
Canadian legal community. Undoubtedly, a political process is in
motion; active lobbying by interest groups of all kinds has been underway. But why do we not witness the same process in the United
States? Legislation in Ohio and Pennsylvania seems to be only the
exception. The reference to a concept of "fairness" may be a reflection of an egalitarian approach that is more pronounced in Canadian society than in the United States. Can the difference between
the two legal sets of rules thus be attributed to variations in culture?

104. See generally Bailey & Crawford, supra note 4.

